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Neighborhood-representing 
Organizations: How 
Democratic Are They? 
Ram A. Cnaan 
University of Pennsylvania 
Neighborhood-representing organizations (NROs) are generally viewed as the most 
authentic form of citizen participation and local democracy. In this article, I question 
how democratic NROs actually are, both on the local level (participatory democracy) 
and in the external arena (representative democracy). I present a new conceptual 
model of the components of democracy in neighborhood organizations. A review 
of the literature is presented within the context of this model to show to what extent NROs are democratic. The findings indicate that the level of democracy in NROs 
is questionable and that the "iron law of oligarchy" is valid for this type of organization. The problem of low participatory and representative democracy is addressed, and 
implications for research and practice are discussed. 
Neighborhood-representing organizations (NROs) serve as a bridge 
between the individual in private life and the large institutions of 
public life. They mediate between the local residents and formal gov- 
ernment and large service institutions.' The goal of an NRO is to 
empower neighborhood residents, counteracting their feelings of pow- 
erlessness and lack of representation.2 As such, NROs are viewed 
primarily as a means of representation that increases residents' awareness 
and responds to their needs and priorities by allocating services and 
goods. Emile Durkheim notes, "A nation can be maintained only if, 
between the state and the individual, there is intercalated a whole 
series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract 
them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, 
into the general torrent of social life."3 
Social Service Review (December 1991). 
© 1991 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
0037-7961/91/6504-0003$01.00 
Neighborhood Organizations 615 
The tradition of emphasizing the role of the citizen as an active 
member of his or her community was introduced into social work in 
the beginning of this century as part of the settlement house movement 
and by the Charity Organization Societies' emphasis on neighborhood 
work.4 According to this tradition, a key component of community 
organization, neighborhood organizations of all kinds serve to prevent 
governmental control and to promote local empowerment.5 
According to Anthony Downs, there are two types of neighborhood- 
based organizations whose purpose it is to improve the quality of life 
for residents." The first type is any group, whether voluntary, public, 
or for profit, that operates within a neighborhood and serves any 
number of subgroups and their interests. This type may include civic 
associations, community housing development corporations, co-ops, 
and local alternative schools.7 Traditionally, these groups focus on a 
single issue, and their constituency is limited to active members or 
users, such as parents of children in an alternative school. In single- 
purpose organizations, formal membership is often required, and, at 
times, active membership is required to be able to benefit from the 
collective goods. 
The second type of neighborhood organization is an NRO. An NRO 
is a local voluntary group managed by local residents that seeks to 
represent all residents, regardless of their personal involvement. 
Neighborhood-representative organizations pressure government 
agencies to be more accessible and more responsive to residents. Fur- 
thermore, NROs traditionally become involved in a variety of communal 
issues. Mancur Olson described the function of voluntary organizations 
as the provision of collective goods.8 In NROs, those who are not 
official members and who may not contribute toward the collective 
goods are nevertheless viewed as a constituency and are free to benefit 
from these collective goods. 
While the boundaries between these two forms of neighborhood 
organizations are often blurred, there are major differences between 
the two groups. For example, public access to the collective goods and 
the community's ability to influence the organization may apply to 
one but not to the other.9 In this article, I concentrate only on NROs. 
There are no reliable data available on the total number of NROs 
in the United States or abroad. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that 
the number runs into the hundreds of thousands. Janice Perlman, for 
example, reports some 10,000 block associations in New York City 
alone, while the National Commission on Neighborhoods lists over 
8,000 large neighborhood organizations of all types in the United 
States.'0 Carl Milofsky, in a survey of neighborhood organizations, 
found that 35 percent were advocacy oriented rather than service or 
single-subject oriented, which indicates that about one-third of all 
neighborhood organizations are NROs.11 In Scotland, there has been 
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a coordinated campaign at the national level to establish NROs, while, 
in Israel, local neighborhood committees (a type of NRO) have sprung 
up in almost every urban neighborhood.12 
There are two popular stances concerning the level of democracy 
in NROs. Those taking the first stance believe that NROs are an ideal 
example of democracy in action. Most proponents of neighborhood- 
based organizations maintain that these organizations are the core of 
democratic society.13 Those taking the second stance believe, based 
on Robert Michels's famous "iron law of oligarchy," that even NROs 
are, by nature, oligarchic. A third possible stance is that representation 
in NROs is high while participation is low, or vice versa. This third 
stance is a mix of the two extreme stances presented above. In this 
article, I do not take the democratic basis of NROs as a given but, 
rather, as a basis for inquiry. My purpose is not to challenge the 
importance of democracy in NROs but, rather, to assess the extent to 
which NROs are democratic. 
A review of the literature on NROs shows that any mention of 
democracy is usually confined to the overall description of the orga- 
nizations. Those studies that did focus on the democratic functioning 
of NROs had a narrow perspective and concentrated largely on a 
limited number of organizations in one locale. Nowhere in the literature 
is there a broad analysis of all the components conducive to the dem- 
ocratic functioning of a wide range of NROs. A substantial portion of 
the literature on NROs is normative in nature, that is, what is ideally 
expected, and there is little empirical data analyzing the level of de- 
mocracy in NROs. 
In this article I aim (1) to develop a model to define levels of democracy, 
including both representative and participatory elements of democracy; 
(2) to review case studies and research findings in the literature on 
NROs and, based on the proposed model, assess their level of both 
representative and participatory democracy; and (3) to assess the overall 
level of democracy in NROs. 
Defining Democracy in NROs 
Many political and social scientists regard NROs as contributing to a 
more democratic society. John L. McKnight claims that "the vital center 
of democracy is the community of associations. Any person without 
access to that forum is effectively denied citizenship."14 This value- 
laden approach has led to increased calls for greater citizen participation 
and decentralization.15 Neighborhood-representative organizations are 
seen as one way to achieve this participatory democracy. Participatory 
democracy focuses on the extent to which an organization is open to 
and incorporates all residents. This view applied to NROs would focus 
on the organization's internal structure and relationships with its con- 
stituencies. 16 
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Many modern political scientists, disillusioned by the concept of 
participatory democracy, have found this form of democracy not only 
impractical but also debilitating. Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl, 
for example, define democracy, not as a process involving as many 
people as possible, but as a way to arrive at political decisions by means 
of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.17 The ordinary citizen, 
then, is involved in the democratic process by determining who will 
make decisions for him or her (representative democracy). 
Thus far, I have described democracy as a two-dimensional concept 
composed of participation and representation. In this article I propose 
10 criteria, based in part on Hanna Pitkin, and Carl Milofsky and 
Joyce Rothschild, by which to assess both the participatory and rep- 
resentative levels of democracy in NROs.18 Pitkin proposes a more 
detailed model of democracy that focuses solely on representative 
democracy. Her model distinguishes among four aspects of repre- 
sentative democracy: formal, descriptive, substantive, and actual rep- 
resentation. Although these categories are important and add to the 
basic dichotomy mentioned above, Pitkin's model does not fully address 
the broad aspects of democracy in neighborhood-based organizations 
because it does not take into account participatory democracy. 
Another attempt to measure democracy in neighborhood-based or- 
ganizations, and one that can be also applied to NROs, was proposed 
by Milofsky and Rothschild. They focused almost exclusively on issues 
of participatory democracy. The key components of their model include 
participation as democracy, voluntarism as democracy, donated re- 
sources as democracy, public meeting as democracy, and member 
activism as democracy. 
These two approaches, in combination, provide the following 10 
criteria for democracy in NROs. 
1. Free, open elections.--This criterion, which Pitkin labels "formal 
representation," is the hallmark of all democratic societies and orga- 
nizations. Without the open and honest election of officials, the power 
in NROs will be held by those who appoint themselves and who care 
only for their own interest. This criterion, which tests the level of 
representative democracy in an NRO, overlaps with some aspects of 
participatory democracy because it calls for active member participation. 
It is important, therefore, to determine to what extent elections are 
held and how many members participate. 
2. Members' participation.--Another criterion of democracy in NROs 
is the extent to which the general members are involved in planning 
and policy-making.19 Organizations with an active membership are 
characterized by open meetings, consensus decision making, and 
members' participation in regular activities and decision-making bodies. 
This criterion tests the level of participatory democracy. 
3. Informed membership. -A third criterion to assess the level of de- 
mocracy is the availability of information. It is imperative that officials 
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of any democratic organization keep their members well informed, 
especially on a local level where most people may know one another 
and rumors are frequent.20 This is important for both representative 
and participatory democracy. Residents cannot be involved in or demand 
action from elected members of an NRO if they are not aware of what 
the organization is doing. 
4. Accountability to constituents. -A fourth criterion of democracy is 
a high level of visibility and accountability of the organization. Democratic 
organizations and their officials must not only open their records to 
the public, but they must also permit internal and external examinations 
of accountability, planning, and accomplishments, including indepen- 
dent investigations and audits. 
5. Due process. -A criterion of participatory democracy is due process, 
which protects members against nepotism, injustices, and harassment. 
Due process assures fair treatment and limits the power of authorities 
in dealing with individuals. Accordingly, a democratic NRO must es- 
tablish and publish clear procedures for action that citizens may follow.21 
Examples include bylaws and protective procedures, such as grievance 
procedures. In contrast, an NRO that has no written guidelines and 
takes action arbitrarily based on the officials' interests can still function, 
but it cannot be considered a participatory or representative democratic 
organization. Rothschild and J. Allen Whitt note that alternative or- 
ganizations, such as community health clinics or parent-run schools, 
are characterized by minimally stipulated rules and primacy of ad hoc 
individual decisions.22 However, in alternative organizations, due process 
is manifested by lengthy discussions in which all members are actively 
participating and in which all members are protected. 
6. Level of similarity. -A sixth criterion of representative democracy 
is the level of similarity between elected officials and the constituency, 
which Pitkin labels as "descriptive representation." Those who hold 
office in NROs should resemble those whom they represent because 
common characteristics often translate into equal interests.23 This as- 
sumption of equal interests may have originated, in part, from the 
Marxist theory of class consciousness. If leaders and constituencies 
belong to the same group, then it is likely that they share the same 
problems and seek the same communal services and goods. If leaders 
belong to a different group, then they will likely pursue services and 
goods in their own self-interest and not those preferred by the majority 
of residents. 
7. Similarity in perceived needs.--This criterion of representative de- 
mocracy was categorized by Pitkin as "substantive representation." She 
argues that good representation entails not only similarity in background 
but, most important, also a common perception by both leaders and 
constituents of problems and their urgency. According to this criterion, 
elected leaders are not to pursue their own private agenda but to 
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represent the interests of all residents. This is especially important in 
NROs where there is no real competition for office and incumbents 
can easily become entrenched. 
8. Cui bono?-This eighth criterion of democracy, based on Peter 
Blau and Richard Scott's typology of organizations, asks who actually 
benefits from the activity of the NRO.24 This criterion focuses on those 
who derive a practical benefit (leaders alone or the whole community). 
Cui bono is a more direct indicator of democratic representation than 
the leaders' perceptions of problems or similarity in characteristics, 
although it is more difficult to measure. According to Richard Rich, 
it is hard to attract leaders without incentives, yet such incentives 
increase the potential for conflict between members' interests in collective 
goods and leaders' interests in maximizing the rewards of their roles.25 
Robert Rosenbloom believes that because neighborhood organizations 
are local and usually do not focus on social reform, leaders and active 
members are largely motivated by the desire to preserve their own 
property value and to improve their quality of life.26 Thus, a careful 
analysis is required as to whose interests are being served and to what 
extent leaders are self-serving. 
9. Successful advocacy. -A ninth criterion of democratic NROs is 
effectiveness in representing the needs and preferences of residents 
vis-A-vis formal institutions. This criterion is, to some extent, parallel 
to what is labeled by Pitkin as "actual representation." I distinguish 
between the personal benefits of leaders (cui bono) and effective rep- 
resentation, although both are grouped by Pitkin as actual represen- 
tation. The reason for this distinction is that, although some leaders 
might not work for their own interests, there is also the possibility 
that they might not work for the collective good but would give pref- 
erence to the interests of government and other external public au- 
thorities.27 These governmental organizations could assimilate these 
leaders and use them as a means of social control to prevent change. 
10. Competition among NROs. -A final criterion of the level of de- 
mocracy in NROs is competition. Competition by various NROs may 
in itself be a positive process; however, it can weaken other democratic 
processes. For example, if several NROs within one neighborhood 
organize to carry out a particular mission, then they may impede one 
another's progress, compete for the same resources, and unintentionally 
weaken the neighborhood. Another example would be when repre- 
sentatives of different organizations compete for the same resources 
for different causes and attempt to influence the same formal orga- 
nization in their own favor. In the latter case, representatives of upper- 
middle-class NROs are likely to be more effective because of their 
stronger political ties, greater experience in lobbying, and greater 
resources, thus reversing the representative democratic effect of NROs 
in low-income neighborhoods.28 One can argue that such a network 
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of NROs is the ideal form of democracy. However, competitive NROs 
are likely to have a harmful effect and serve as a means for preventing 
change and for perpetuating the current social order in the neigh- 
borhood. 
In the remainder of this article, I will review data from various 
studies that are relevant to these 10 criteria of democratic functioning. 
Findings related to single-purpose organizations are excluded. A few 
methodological limitations should be acknowledged. First, numerous 
studies are used for this examination, some of which were conducted 
outside the United States. The meaning and cultural contexts of NROs 
in different countries may differ. Second, a neighborhood may have 
more than one NRO; thus, some may represent the whole neighborhood 
while others serve a certain subpopulation. Both types are included 
in this study. Third, the NROs studied varied in size, scope of activities, 
and history. Finally, the decision as to whether a certain local group 
is an NRO is seldom clear. However, my findings are consistent across 
this methodological variation and thus indicate strong validity. 
Free, Open Elections 
Free, open elections are the most common symbol of democracy and 
thus are an important criterion in testing the level of democracy in 
NROs. In Dayton, Ohio, even though the city mandated and supported 
formal elections for NROs and mailed out ballots with stamped return 
envelopes, only a small percentage of residents bothered to vote.29 In 
a study of 11 NROs in Indianapolis, Rich determined that only a small 
percentage of members had actually voted in the elections and that 
officeholders in the NROs ran virtually uncontested in the elections.30 
From a study of 20 NROs in Israel, Joseph Katan and I conclude that 
most officials are either self-appointed or appointed by interested city 
officials.31 Ruth Liron and Shimon Spiro, in a study of project renewal 
in Israel, found that approximately 40 percent of the officials had 
been appointed and that another third had volunteered.32 Although 
it is often difficult for NROs to find residents who are willing to run 
for office, those who do agree are almost invariably elected, and there 
seldom is a real threat of being voted out of office. 
Ibrahim Regab, Arthur Blum, and Michael Murphy report that in 
Cleveland, Ohio, all the organizations they studied had been started 
by a small group of residents who, upset by a critical incident in the 
neighborhood, had decided to do something about it, which reflects 
self-appointment.33 A similar phenomenon of self-appointment is re- 
ported by Terry Cooper in a case study in Los Angeles.34 Cooper notes 
that, when the NRO became involved in a major planning effort, only 
members who had the required skills remained active. Michael Masterson 
reports that, in a government-proposed plan to establish neighborhood 
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councils in Scotland, only 28 percent of the councils held a contested 
election and that, overall, only about 15 percent of council residents 
bothered to vote.35 As a result, councilors, to a large extent, selected 
one another. 
The overall trend from these studies is that the election of many 
neighborhood officials is not entirely democratic. It may be the voluntary 
nature of these offices and the attendant costs that make them un- 
attractive to many residents. The lack of competition may contribute 
to Pamela Oliver's findings that active participation is also based on 
the belief that there is no one else to do the job.36 While such a motive 
ensures some citizen involvement, it is insufficient to generate the 
competition required for a true democratic election process. 
Member Participation 
In his Indianapolis study, Rich found that officers and a few activists 
did almost all the work in NROs. Similarly, Katan and I report that, 
in Israel, residents are rarely involved in NROs.37 Paul King and Orly 
Hacohen discovered that, in Israel, even some officials took no active 
part in the organization.38 To a great extent, the few officials who did 
serve preferred not to be bothered by the dictates of the other residents. 
Cooper reports that, the more successful an NRO becomes, the more 
it tends to de-emphasize resident participation.39 He also notes that, 
as issues become more technical and professional, the likelihood of 
organizational stagnation and oligarchic decision making increases. 
Curtis Ventriss and Robert Pecorella document the case of one or- 
ganization that was able to avoid professionalization and maintain 
close contacts with many residents.40 Nevertheless, it seems that in the 
life cycle of NROs, professionalization and detachment from residents 
is more the norm than the exception. Stephen McNamee and Kimberly 
Swisher report that "the incomplete records and our own observations 
at meetings indicate generally poor attendance at most priority board 
meetings."4' Vincent Bolduc notes that, in most board meetings that 
were open to all, only the board members participated and that, on 
average, one new person attended every other meeting.42 Similarly, 
Howard Hallman describes a case study in Columbus, Ohio, in which 
attendance by residents gradually diminished and the executive council 
became the dominant body.43 Michael Lipsky and Margaret Levi studied 
several NROs in poor communities and found that, because the leaders 
had difficulty in defining what the rewards of membership might be, 
local residents were not receptive to the organization, even though it 
might serve them.44 
The findings from these studies indicate a trend of minimal resident 
participation. It may be that many officials in NROs recognize the 
importance of residents' involvement but also view it as costly and as 
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an unwelcome and added burden. This is especially true of older 
NROs, in which the zeal of the start-up stage has passed.45 
Keeping Members Informed 
In a nationwide study, Curt Lamb discovered that nearly two-thirds 
of the residents in black neighborhoods could not name even one 
important local group.46 In his study, Rich found only very limited 
contact between officers and members of the organizations.47 Even 
when they could expect positive rewards from such contacts, leaders 
failed to develop adequate networks with residents. Bolduc reports 
that most of the residents surveyed in Hartford, Connecticut, could 
not accurately describe any neighborhood association activities, even 
though the association published a monthly neighborhood newspaper.48 
According to Katan and me, and King and Hacohen, NROs in Israel 
are not required to communicate with or report to local residents.49 
They report that some organizations used one-to-one communication 
as a method of reporting and very few mailed out reports or made 
formal reports in a local newspaper, and then only on an irregular 
basis. In all cases, the information was filtered by the leaders. Liron 
and Spiro reveal that only 30 percent of the neighborhood residents 
studied viewed the organization as representative and only 12 percent 
knew an organization official by name.50 Finally, Matthew Crenson 
studied the level of awareness of NROs by residents in six Baltimore 
neighborhoods.51 He determined that only 40 percent knew of such 
an organization in their neighborhood and were able to name it. This 
study clearly indicates a level of detachment between NROs and res- 
idents, but further study is necessary to validate the findings. 
This review of the literature suggests that the means used by NROs 
to communicate with residents are varied, inadequate, and not entirely 
democratic in nature. First, there are no clear guidelines as to what 
information should be made public. Second, most of the methods 
used by NROs to communicate with residents are informal and on an 
ad hoc basis. Finally, for the most part, all information they provide 
is censored and approved by the officials beforehand. 
Accountability 
Very few of the studies reviewed in this article mention any formal 
internal or external form of evaluation or auditing. None of the studies 
report employing a certified public accountant or other qualified 
professionals as an independent auditor, and none use an external 
means of evaluation. Furthermore, the studies did not report any 
attempt at systematic evaluation from within. Interestingly, most studies 
reviewed were initiated by the researchers, and officials of the NROs 
Neighborhood Organizations 623 
granted permission to the researcher to participate and record. Thus, 
the officials, once elected or appointed, apparently had little or no 
accountability to their constituencies. 
One study explicitly deals with accountability. Patrick Sills, Hugh 
Butcher, Patricia Collis, and Andrew Glen, in a study of five NROs 
in their formative stage in England, note that those who initiated the 
new NROs maintained leadership roles and were not accountable to 
members and residents.52 
In contrast, most studies of single-purpose organizations find high 
levels of evaluation and auditing. For example, in a detailed analysis 
of a civic organization in South Africa, Patricia Wheeldon reports the 
use of auditing, and Milofsky and Sandra Elion cite the use of evaluation 
in a local alternative school.53 It may be that organizations with specific, 
service-oriented missions encourage careful review, while organizations 
that are broadly representative tend not to emphasize accountability. 
Due Process 
McKnight, a strong proponent of NROs, asserts that such organizations 
can respond quickly to residents' complaints because NROs are not 
overly complex.54 There are no formal procedures in selecting an 
issue and no institutional barriers to planning and taking action. Re- 
gardless of the benefits, the literature indicates that due process is 
seldom found in NROs. 
According to Rich, the "leadership cadre" of the NRO makes most 
of the decisions regarding what projects to implement, how funds 
should be raised, and what position to take on issues affecting the 
community.55 This finding is supported also by Sills, Butcher, Collis, 
and Glen's study of five NROs in England.56 Steven Haeberle studied 
93 NROs in Birmingham, Alabama, over a 1-year period and found 
that the number of meetings per association ranged from 0 to 16, with 
a median of 7, although each association was required to meet once 
each month." The leaders appeared to make most of the decisions 
and plans in private with minimal regard for written procedures. Bolduc 
notes that NRO leaders recognize their uncontested power but do 
very little to change the situation.58 Katan and I indicate that none of 
the NROs in Israel have bylaws that clearly state the rules on public 
scrutiny or on the appeals process.59 King and Hacohen also disclose 
that none of the NROs in their sample have grievance procedures.60 
These findings indicate that NROs operate with little concern for 
due process. Most NROs act according to the current leader or activist's 
preferences and rarely commit to written bylaws. At times they reflect 
the interests of a small cadre of leaders and active members at the 
expense of other residents who have no established means to claim 
their case. 
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Similarity between Leaders and Members 
Of all types of political participation, community leadership is strongly 
and positively related to socioeconomic status."61 This may be because 
community leadership requires a high degree of professional skill and 
communication capabilities.62 Downs finds that residents with the 
greatest financial or emotional investment in the status quo are the 
most active in NROs.63 Because those in power in many NROs prefer 
only minimal change and strongly support conservative measures to 
maintain the status quo, many of those who are extremely dissatisfied 
with the current situation opt to move away from the neighborhood. 
Sue Ann Allen found that, while 63 percent of the homes in East 
Lansing, Michigan, were renter occupied, only 7 percent of the members 
and 14 percent of the leaders in the NRO were renters, which reflects 
a clear bias toward homeowners."64 This does not imply that affluent 
neighborhoods necessarily have more active NROs; rather, the leaders 
in each neighborhood, regardless of its relative socioeconomic status, 
tend to be those whose income and status is higher than that of other 
residents. Abraham Wandersman, Paul Florin, Robert Friedmann, 
and Ron Meier observe that, in both Israel and Nashville, Tennessee, 
"rootedness" in the community is related to active participation in 
NROs.65 "Rootedness" means living for a long period of time in the 
area, intending to stay longer, having children, and owning a home. 
Regab, Blum, and Murphy report that leaders have higher incomes 
than members and other residents and are more likely to work in 
professional or managerial occupations.66 This trend is borne out by 
Bolduc's study in Hartford, Connecticut, Masterson's study in Scotland, 
Sills and colleagues' study in England, and Yasumasa Kuroda's study 
in Japan.67 This trend, with minimal variations, has held constant since 
the early studies on personal characteristics of NRO leaders.68 Thus, 
leaders in NROs can be clearly characterized as the neighborhood 
elite. 
The overall findings from the literature indicate that the leaders of 
NROs are not democratically elected by the residents, operate in se- 
clusion from other residents, are not accountable to residents, operate 
according to their own interests and style rather than by due process, 
and are not typical community members but the local elite. This profile 
raises questions as to the match between the community needs of 
leaders and residents. It also raises questions as to whom the leaders 
are serving--themselves, their subgroup within the neighborhood, or the neighborhood as a whole. 
Similarity in Perceived Needs 
Regab, Blum, and Murphy studied neighborhood needs as perceived 
by leaders, members, and residents and found that leaders rated prob- 
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lems as more severe than did members and residents.69 They found a correlation between leaders and residents in the perception of problem 
urgency of .42. They indicate that this correlation is high but fail to 
account for chance agreement. If these considerations were taken into 
account, the correlation would be quite low and would indicate dif- 
ferences in perception between activists and residents. Regab, Blum, 
and Murphy also note that residents and leaders significantly disagree 
on 40 percent of the issues, mostly in the area of housing and city 
services. In a later paper on the same sample, Blum and Regab report 
that, after a few years in office, leaders became more interested in 
citywide issues than those of the neighborhood and residents lost 
interest in the NROs.70 
Crenson found a similar gap between residents and organizational 
activists in six Baltimore neighborhoods.71 In Japan, Kuroda found 
significant differences between leaders and residents with regard to 
international attitudes, economic liberalism, taxes, and authoritari- 
anism.72 Cooper shows how an NRO, involved in carrying out a complex 
mission of developing, obtaining formal approval, and carrying out a 
large-scale housing project in the neighborhood, slowly divorces itself 
from the perceived needs of many residents.73 According to Cooper, 
dealing with complex formal organizations shifts the focus of NRO 
officials from the needs of the residents to those of a technically oriented 
group of professionals with whom they frequently interact. Thus, 
officials gradually find it difficult to attend to the needs of the "une- 
ducated" residents. Sills, Butcher, Collis, and Glen and Ventriss and 
Pecorella show that the act of being attentive to residents' needs and 
interests is slow, frustrating, and often discordant and can lead to 
burnout for its unpaid, unrewarded workers.74 
The overall trend that emerges from the studies reviewed is that, 
over time, NROs become more professional and bureaucratic while 
neglecting residents' concerns. Furthermore, long-term leaders become 
impatient with residents and tend to prefer to work on what they 
perceive as good for the residents rather than work with the residents, 
which further widens the gap between the two groups' perceived needs. 
Cui Bono 
Theoretical literature like that of Rich and Olson assumes that personal 
gains motivate some or all people who volunteer to be NRO leaders.75 
With some exceptions, the literature does not seem to support a hy- 
pothesis that NRO leaders serve solely to benefit themselves; they 
often function to serve the subgroup to which they belong. Robert 
Whelman and Robert Dupont show how appointment of the local elite 
to a task force to revive the New Orleans Zoo helped protect the 
interests of affluent subgroups in the area.76 Allen found that in East 
Lansing, Michigan, the positions taken by the association were largely 
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those of homeowners (the majority in the association) and not those 
of renters (the majority in the neighborhood).77 Bolduc's findings in 
Hartford, Connecticut, reveal that most residents were unaware of 
the two programs the NRO offered, which indicates a division between 
leaders-beneficiaries and general residents.78 
Rich and Katan and I argue that material rewards gained by leaders 
in NROs are minimal.79 Similarly Wandersman, Florin, Friedmann, 
and Meier find that the cost of participation-that is, donations, time 
from work or family, and neighbors' requests-far exceeds any available 
material rewards.80 These studies indicate that the major rewards for 
leaders are the satisfaction generated by their activities and accom- 
plishment within the NRO and that most leaders do not use their 
position to improve their material status or to abuse their office. It 
may be that these findings are biased by the limited accountability of 
and challenge to leaders, and abuse of office may be more prevalent 
than reported. The overall reported trend in the literature, however, 
is that NRO leaders have more potential for benefiting neighborhood 
subgroups than for personal gain. 
Successful Advocacy 
Regab, Blum, and Murphy report limited congruence between the 
problems perceived as most urgent by the residents and those on which 
NROs actually concentrate.81 They explain this gap by noting that 
residents stressed problems that had direct impact on the quality of 
their daily life, while leaders sought a balance between immediate and 
long-range problems. However, this gap may also indicate that leaders 
adopt perspectives that are comparable to those of city officials. 
Many studies of NROs indicate that after a stage of reform and 
activism, both leaders and members co-opt into the formal organizations. 
Instead of representing the interest of local residents, they begin to 
assist external authorities in deliverng services or in obtaining relevant 
data."2 These studies reveal that even the most contentious NROs, 
those that manage to survive for more than a decade, eventually become 
community service providers and neglect their earlier advocacy func- 
tion.83 Katan and I found that very few NROs in Israel were involved 
in advocacy or reform and that the majority either served formal 
organizations or were inactive.84 Similarly, McNamee and Swisher 
note that NROs in Dayton, Ohio, spend only 4 percent of their time 
on planning or policy-making at the city or county level.85 Their main 
interest is serving the city and county's need for local information and 
preserving the NRO. 
Again, the overall trend indicated in the literature is that, over time, 
NRO leaders often disassociate themselves from local residents and 
ally themselves with the formal institutions with which they commu- 
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nicate. Once NROs become institutionalized, they either become co- 
producers of services for the local government or become inactive. 
Thus, they abandon the reformist zeal and participatory spirit that led to and characterize their establishment and the representative role for which they continue to exist.86 
Competition among Organizations 
The existence of several NROs, contrary to single-function organizations, tends to weaken their individual power of representation.87 A few 
researchers report hostility and a loss of power among some competing 
groups whose members are often from different ethnic, racial, or social 
groups.88 The existence of NROs in every neighborhood perpetuates class differences and serves to better the interests of the upper middle class. Michael Williams notes several instances in which NROs, claiming to represent residents, managed to keep blacks out of all-white areas and to oppose orders to integrate schools.89 McNamee and Swisher reveal that the formation of NROs in upper-middle-class neighborhoods results in loss of power and resources in the nearly all black, inner- 
city neighborhoods.90 Poor neighborhoods cannot generate resources and will often rely on funds from authorities or be co-opted in other 
ways.91 Due to problems in raising funds and hiring professional staff, it seems evident that the poorer the neighborhood, the less powerful the organization will be. 
The above findings indicate that NROs, like any other social structure, often serve to undermine their own positive intentions. When a number of neighborhoods have NROs, the relative advantage for low socio- economic neighborhoods disappears. Furthermore, competition among local groups reduces their effectiveness as they fight over narrow in- terests. Competition also enables public officials to recruit these or- 
ganizations for their own purposes. 
Discussion 
Leaders of NROs are usually well-intentioned residents who, concerned 
by conditions in their neighborhood, decide to organize to improve 
things. These leaders select methods in line with their experience and 
values. In many instances, residents become leaders in a nondemocratic 
manner, such as appointment by external organizations or self-ap- 
pointment. Even those who are elected are elected by a few residents 
and often face no real competition. 
Because rewards for leadership are meager, few people wish to 
become leaders, a fact that renders officers less vulnerable to the sanctions 
of impeachment by residents.92 Furthermore, as is the case with most 
leaders, these officials are usually at a higher socioeconomic level than 
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are their constituencies. Uri Bronfenbrenner sees this as an indication 
of representative democracy, in which the best and most able represent 
the interests of all residents." However, it is also a sign of a low-level 
participatory democracy in which full citizenship is limited to the elite. 
Rich uses the exchange theory from a materialist perspective to 
argue that leaders of NROs very seldom receive material rewards for 
their efforts on behalf of the neighborhood.94 Because their rewards 
are intrinsic, they do not need the other residents to be active in the 
NRO. The leadership group establishes its own system of social ex- 
changes, such as their periodic meetings over refreshments, that gen- 
erates benefits that offset the cost of running the organization. This 
increases the leaders' detachment from their constituencies. 
Officials in NROs tend to create a small cadre of activists and to 
exchange information within this select circle. As a result, most residents 
are unaware of what is going on, except during the development and 
conflict phases of the organization. In this respect, NROs, like many 
other organizations, subscribe to Michels's "iron law of oligarchy"- 
that is, all organizations develop small but highly centralized and bu- 
reaucratic bodies of leaders-the elite-who will necessarily compromise 
democratic principles and keep most residents from participating and 
electing new leaders.95 
Some cities and national organizations have developed bylaws and 
democratic procedures that NROs are expected to observe in their 
day-to-day operation.96 Yet NROs are characterized by a high level of 
flexibility and informality, which allows leaders to do as they wish. 
There are very few, if any, mechanisms for control or accountability 
to hinder officials of NROs. 
Marlyn Gittle suggests that democratic citizen participation orga- 
nizations may initially promote social change and adhere to participatory 
democratic processes but that they tend to be absorbed by the very 
institutional structures they had set out to change.97 Along the same 
lines, Cooper argues that leadership demands technical and bureaucratic 
skills that alienate the constituencies--a principal characteristic of the 
"iron law of oligarchy."98 Thus, many NROs, which at the outset 
involved residents in a democratic process, accommodate public au- 
thorities once they mature. When the social reform drive wanes, these 
organizations become less active, more self-preserving, more controlled 
by outside authorities, and less concerned with their democratic base. 
John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, in an analysis of social movement 
organizations, note that, to obtain needed external resources, orga- 
nizations must meet the idiosyncratic preferences of those providing 
the resources, the democratic nature of the organization is compromised, 
and the survival of the organization becomes primary.99 
Ventriss and Pecorella found one exception: a neighborhood or- 
ganization that managed to remain accountable and close to its resi- 
dents.100 They note that this effort was at the expense of attaining 
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goals and required patient, dedicated leaders who wanted to educate 
rather than achieve. The fact that this is the only exception reported 
in the literature indicates that both participatory and representative 
democracy are often compromised in NROs. 
Conclusion 
The major function of NROs is to moderate the power of complex 
organizations that influence the local scene and to represent the needs 
and preferences of local residents. However, a review of the literature 
indicates a low level of both participatory and representative democracy 
in NROs. From the representative point of view, NROs appear to be 
a mechanism of social control used by local government and other 
authorities. From the participatory point of view, NROs appear to be 
potentially regressive and elitist groups. Thus, I raise the question as 
to the overall desirability of NROs. 
My analysis in this study focused on the actual functioning of NROs 
from an atomistic framework. One may also view NROs from a holistic 
perspective. In this respect, Williams notes that NROs can be, and 
often are, reactionary, racist, and antiprogressive while, paradoxically, 
serving other important functions in the neighborhoods.101 For example, 
NROs may assist in the individual and collective process of empowering 
residents or changing attitudes. Such contributions are essential elements 
in the democratic structure of any given society, and, though difficult 
to measure, they should not be ignored. Furthermore, the NROs may 
have an impact on how city planners and politicians regard the autonomy 
and self-determination of the residents. Without NROs, apathy and 
hopelessness might prevail on the neighborhood level, and city and 
other authorities would be free to do as they pleased, without regard 
to residents' needs and priorities. Neighborhood-representing orga- 
nizations may have potentially decreased officials' paternalism. Finally, 
the mere existence of a local NRO may add to the pride of residents 
and their feeling of belonging even if they themselves are totally alienated 
from the organization.'02 The level of democracy should not be the 
only criterion by which NROs are measured. Indirect evidence as to 
the importance of NROs is provided by Harry Boyte.103 Based on a 
survey by the Christian Science Monitor in 1977, he reports that most 
interviewees believed voluntary organizations were more active in 
helping cities and neighborhoods than was government or big business. 
These findings are in line with Constance Smith and Anne Freeman's 
pluralistic thesis that voluntary organizations of all types contribute 
to democracy in society as a whole, even if they themselves are not 
necessarily democratic.104 
It is quite possible that NROs are worthwhile and democratic only 
when there is a real threat or common problem strong enough to 
unite and excite the residents. In such cases, NROs serve the majority, 
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are open to residents' input and participation, and are less subject to 
the influence of the authorities. However, as time passes and the 
common cause that united residents fades, NROs tend to become more 
closed, less democratic, and weaker. As such, it is questionable whether 
the existence of NROs is justified in the postreform stage. A better 
alternative may be for residents and community organizers alike to 
develop lively "ad hoc" NROs and to dismantle them once the goal 
has been achieved. In this respect, enthusiasm and a higher level of 
democracy will compensate for lack of experience and established 
structures. However, like all organizations, survival may become the 
primary goal in times of peace, and NROs do serve several positive 
functions that would not be performed were they to be dismantled. 
These include providing authorities with relevant information in the 
interest of better services and assisting individual residents with problems. 
My thesis in this article is that there is a discrepancy between the 
potential and actual level of democracy in NROs. Before more conclusive 
assertions can be made, research is required to assess the level of 
democracy in NROs. These studies should also focus on practices that 
increase levels of democracy in NROs. Finally, policymakers, neigh- 
borhood activists, and local officials should be more aware of these 
issues and work in ways that will enable NROs to represent the neigh- 
borhood rather than the authorities or the leaders. The problem of 
rewards for leaders is a crucial one.105 Because the rewards of leadership 
are minimal, very few wish to compete for office, and without the fear 
of being unseated, leaders have no incentive for democratic performance 
and need not be accountable. A more attractive reward system would 
increase competition and increase the level of democracy in NROs. 
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